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In this essay, we analyze the public communication debacle before the
2009 L’Aquila earthquake that led to the infamous trial of the “L’Aquila
Seven.” Examining the trial transcripts to extract norms regarding the
proper role of scientists in society, we conclude that the fırst verdict
interpellated the fıgure of the responsible scientist citizen who is expected
to perform rhetorical citizenship when communicating with a lay public,
while the second assumed a distinction between public and technical
spheres that absolves scientists from responsibility to their fellow citizens
and reduces their role to performance of an expertise divorced from
rhetoric. Tracing the civic outcomes of these conflicting norms, we identify
three missed opportunities during the prequake discourse in which the
scientists failed to correct statements that they, and only they, knew to be
flawed. To prevent future communicative debacles that arise from a
dangerous separation of scientists and laypeople, we argue that scientists
need to come to see themselves as scientist citizens, experts who take on the
civic responsibility of clearly communicating their knowledge to their
fellow citizens when such sharing is necessary to the public good.
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OnOctober 22, 2012, six scientists with expertise in seismology andone offıcial with Italy’s Department of Civil Protection (DCP)were sentenced to six years in prison, after being convicted of
negligence and manslaughter. The sentence condemned their communica-
tion failures during and immediately after an extraordinary meeting of
Italy’s Major Risks Commission (MRC) that had taken place in L’Aquila,
the capital of the Abruzzo region in central Italy, fıve days before the
destructive earthquake that hit that town on April 6, 2009. That emergency
gathering had been publicized through a local press release that said the
invited seismologists would gather in L’Aquila with the “goal of providing
the citizens of Abruzzo with all the information available to the scientifıc
community on the seismic activity of the last few weeks.”1 In his verdict,
Judge Marco Billi argued that the six scientists were not only negligent for
conducting a hasty and grossly inadequate risk assessment, but they were
also guilty on the manslaughter charges for having provided “imprecise,
incomplete, and contradictory information” to the public in L’Aquila. Their
negligence in not “informing the public with clear, correct and complete
information”—according to the judge—resulted in the disastrously reassur-
ing (and flawed) public perception that the many seismic shocks that had
plagued the region could be considered a “favorable” dissipation of seismic
energy, which reduced the likelihood of a more destructive event.2
According to the judge, that reassuring interpretation of the seismic
swarm, reported to the public by the DCP offıcial as being the defınitive
outcome of the scientifıc meeting, helped to persuade many residents of
L’Aquila that their folkloric cautionary practice of escaping their homes to
spend a few hours outside after medium intensity shocks was not only
unnecessary but also quaintly irrational. After hearing the reassuring mes-
sage of the expert meeting, they abruptly interrupted that traditional prac-
tice. Five days later, a number of those who chose to stay indoors after two
moderate shocks hit the town on the night of April 5 were killed or badly
injured in collapsing buildingswhen the disastrous quake struck in the early
morning hours of April 6.3
Two years after the manslaughter verdict, an appeals court in Italy
overturned the decision, acquitting the scientists and only upholding the
conviction of Bernardo De Bernardinis, the DCP offıcial with no expertise
in seismology who addressed the public to report the conclusions of the
MRC meeting. Among the reasons given for this reversal upon appeal was
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the claim that the scientists of the MRC did not have a responsibility to
communicate to the public.4 Appearing to follow a standard purifıcation
strategy that separates technical sphere frompublic sphere, and thus divides
risk analysis from risk communication, the three-judge appeals panel ruled
that the faulty public communication was De Bernardinis’s fault alone.5
Putting aside the legal reasoning in this case, which we do not have the
authority or inclination to contest, we think that the civic, ethical, and
rhetorical outcome of this decision is troubling.While we are not in favor of
imprisoning scientists, we think it is a bad idea to completely absolve the
scientists from responsibility for the failed public communication in
L’Aquila. As we will show, there were at least three occasions when the
scientists who participated in the MRC meeting in L’Aquila had an oppor-
tunity to act not only as scientists but also as rhetorical citizens capable of
correcting the misinformation that De Bernardinis conveyed to the public.
Looking at this case through Christian Kock and Lisa Villadsen’s notion of
rhetorical citizenship, we demonstrate that “there is a need for rhetoric in a
deliberative democracy” and that what is meant by rhetoric is “not just
discourse by public offıcials or candidates.”6 For scientists—who dwell in
the public sphere like every other citizen—rhetorical citizenship includes
evaluating and correcting the public rhetoric that is offered in their name, as
a summary of their expert assessments. In fact, this is a mode of civic
engagement that is available only to them. The public communication
debacle in L’Aquila did not happen because the scientists failed to engage
enough in their expert assessment during the meeting. Rather, it happened
because they failed to engage as rhetorical citizens who had relevant exper-
tise in relation to the public communication that circulated in L’Aquila
around the MRC meeting. As Kock and Villadsen remind us in their
discussion of rhetorical citizenship, in contemporary society “it also be-
comes increasingly urgent that citizens themselves take part in public
exchange that invokes not only segment interests but also the common
good.”7 In L’Aquila, the scientists of theMRCwere the only citizens capable
of rectifying the flawed information that De Bernardinis passed to the local
residents, and they repeatedly failed to enact that civic task—neglecting the
common good by failing to actualize the power of their rhetorical agency as
scientist citizens.
They failed to do so on at least three occasions: in themeeting itself when
the incorrect claim about energy dissipation was raised as a subject for
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discussion, at the end of themeetingwhen a public offıcialmade a comment
that indicated her misunderstanding of the science, and during the public
communication after themeeting, particularly during the press conference,
where the presence of MRC experts sitting with De Bernardinis conveyed
their tacit assent to his disastrous reassurances. Absolving the scientists
from responsibility for their lack of communication during these moments
fosters the reoccurrence of such communicative failures in the future by
segregating scientists from the larger community of which they are part.
CarolynR.Miller has argued that the separation of risk analysis from risk
communication, while commonly assumed by those who practice both, “is
a false distinction” because “risk analysis is a form of communicating about
risk.”8 We agree. We take her claim in a different direction, though, by
emphasizing that experts in a scientifıc fıeld who engage in risk analysis are
responsible for conveying the results of their work to nonexperts, whether
they do so by speaking directly to the public or by speaking to a public
offıcial who has taken on the task of communicating that risk to the public
in their name. When we release scientists from their duty to communicate
the conclusions of their risk analysis to nonexperts under the supposition
that their responsibility ends in the technical sphere, we are left with a
dangerous gap between science and the public that can have disastrous
results. We also agree with Miller that “an ethos of expertise—that is, an
ethos grounded not in moral values or goodwill, or even in practical judg-
ment, but rather in a narrow technical knowledge” tends to accompany the
separation of technical sphere risk analysis frompublic sphere risk commu-
nication and does not serve either scientists or the public well.9 To earn the
trust we invest in them, scientists must draw upon a full rhetorical ethos
grounded in moral values (arête), goodwill (eunoia), and practical judg-
ment (phronesis).
Considering how the proper role of scientists is confıgured in the two
judicial decisions on the L’Aquila case, we argue that the fırst decision
interpellated the promising fıgure of the responsible scientist-as-citizen
who is expected to enact public engagement by taking up an integrated
rhetorical ethos in communicatingwith a broader public, or at least correct-
ing inaccurate information communicated to that public in his or her name,
whereas the second decision assumed a false distinction between public and
technical spheres that inappropriately absolves scientists from responsibil-
ity to their fellow citizens and reduces their ethos to an expertise divorced
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from rhetoric. The alienation of scientists from their responsibilities as
agents in a broader civic culture comes, as LyndaWalsh puts it, “at the cost
of an integrated ethos” for “scientist-citizens.”10 Our study of the civic
responsibility of the L’Aquila scientists is important because it helps to
establish that cost and thereby promotes the constitution of rhetorically
sensitive scientist citizens, who, as philosopher Heather Douglas puts it,
“have the same obligations as the rest of us not to be reckless or negligent.”11
THE LESSON TO BE LEARNED FROM L’AQUILA
In establishing the responsibility of scientists to act asmembers of a broader
civic community, this study offers a new understanding of the lesson to be
learned from L’Aquila. Many scientists and science journalists who have
written about this case have come to two conclusions about what it teaches
us, both of which we fınd problematic. The fırst lesson that they have drawn
from L’Aquila follows from the common misconception that the scientists
were prosecuted for failing to predict the earthquake. Tracing out the
implications of that assumption, they conclude that the indictment of the
scientists and the decision of Judge Billi had a chilling effect on scientists
asked to do risk analysis, an effect that can only be reversed by indemnifying
future science advisors from lawsuits. As Thomas Jordan, chair of the
International Commission on Earthquake Forecasting for Civil Protection,
put it, this case “will cast a pall over any attempt to improve” the system for
communicating risk to the public because “scientists are learning to keep
their mouths shut.”12 One of the main “lessons” to be learned from
L’Aquila, he says, is that we “need to separate the role of science advisors”
from “that of civil decision-makers” because “misconstruing these roles
leads to trouble.”13
We think that this is an ironic lesson for people to be taking from this
case. Keeping their mouths shut was the very thing that got these scientists
into trouble in the fırst place, so learning to keep their mouths shut seems a
particularly perverse conclusion to draw from the case. It is likely that the
scientists whomet in L’Aquila were silent in the face of misinformation as a
direct result of their belief that their job was complete when the risk analysis
was done and the separate job of the risk communication andmanagement
specialist had begun. Had they recognized that risk analysis includes effec-
tive communication of their conclusions with those who hold less expertise
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on the subject, including communication with the public offıcial who was
speaking in their name—making sure that he understood the science and
was describing it accurately to others—then the people of L’Aquila would
not have beenmisled into thinking that the swarm of earthquakes they were
experiencing reduced the likelihood of a larger event.
A second lesson from this case that has been repeated in a number of
news outlets is that the scientists erred because they were too close to the
politicians, allowing themselves to be used as puppets by offıcials at theDCP
in a sham risk analysis held to support the predetermined outcome of
calming the public by reassuring them that the danger was low. Just like
those who extracted the previous lesson from this case, these commentators
draw the conclusion that to avoid this sort of thing in the future, scientists
should do a better job of isolating themselves from politics; they should
retreat to the technical sphere where the science of risk analysis can be
performed away from the corrupting influence of risk communication and
management.14
While this interpretation of the scientists as puppets of the government
has some truth to it, we think it too ultimately misses the point. The
scientists who met in L’Aquila that day likely failed to perform rhetorical
citizenship in countering the misconceptions of De Bernardinis and his
boss because they saw themselves as separate frompolitics, not because they
were too close to these politicians. We think the scientists in L’Aquila did
not overengage in issues relevant to politics and the public sphere; rather,
they underengaged by failing to intervene to correct public misrepresenta-
tions of their conclusions. Not recognizing that their duty as citizens was to
act as whistleblowers against misguided attempts to calm their fellow citi-
zens in the general public, they acted as technical experts only, shutting their
mouthswhen they could not affırm the reassuring energy dissipation theory
those politicians wanted to hear, and then with a failure of rhetorical
citizenship, washing their hands of the whole affair to retreat to the techni-
cal sphere as soon as the meeting was over. Had they acted as scientists who
likewise see themselves as citizens, as agents in the public sphere with a
responsibility to their fellow citizens, they would have actively resisted
attempts to co-opt their expertise for inaccurate messages of reassurance.
Our own reading of the case offers a lesson that is the opposite of these
other two lessons that have been proposed in popular accounts. We think
this case shows that scientists need to think of themselves beyond their role
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as analysts isolated and protected in the technical sphere. Our reading also
complicates or signifıcantly extends research done by other rhetoricians on
this case. In their study of the organizational rhetoric of this case, Emina
Herovic, Timothy Sellnow, and Kathryn Anthony argue that the disaster
was the result of either “external pressure” on public offıcials or their “gross
misunderstanding of the conclusions provided by the scientists.”15 Our
study suggests that this conclusion lays the blame too completely on the
public offıcials and unfairly lets the scientists off the hook. In their study of
the legal rhetoric of this case, Marouf Hasian, Nicholas Paliewicz, and
Robert Gehl point out that the L’Aquila scientists “engaged in boundary
work that maintained the scientifıc ethos of seismologists, while absolving
them of legal responsibility.”16 Whether or not the scientists are legally
culpable, we argue that their boundary work does not absolve them from
their ethical responsibilities as members of a polis and paradoxically may
have contributed to the tragic outcome of this case. To avoid such tragedies
in the future, scientists need to see themselves as simultaneously perform-
ing a duty as citizens in the public sphere, with a responsibility borne of
their special expertise to communicate the results of their risk analysis
with those who do not have that expertise. Our reading of this case aligns
with that of Danielle DeVasto, Scott Graham, and Louise Zamparutti, who
argue thatwhatwas required in this situationwas a “true hybrid forum” that
brings together experts and laypersons.17 But extending their conclusion,
we argue that a forum is not enough; scientists have a special responsibility
to enact that hybridity in ethical communication in and around that forum
to bridge the gap between the technical and public spheres. Our reading also
differs from the one offered by DeVasto on her own, insofar as she argues
that a promising candidate for the interactional expertise necessary to
bridge the gap between expert and layperson was De Bernardinis, whose
epic failure to unite technical content and public communicationwas “most
surprising” in this case.18 We are not surprised by that failure, because De
Bernardinis was not an expert on earthquakes. We argue that the L’Aquila
scientists are more promising candidates for bridging technical and public
knowledge because they dwell in both spheres.
When the trial was just beginning, argumentation scholar Sally Jackson
said that because the six scientists “undoubtedly knew that what De Bernar-
dinis said was false and dangerous,” and yet “they did not contradict De
Bernardinis, then or later,” they may have shirked the “duty of care” that
SCIENTIST CITIZENS 101
This work originally appeared in Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 22.1, spring  2019, published by Michigan State University Press
they had as experts who are also members of a larger citizenry. After all,
“scientifıc practice is subject to the same moral responsibilities as apply to
any other social action.” However, when Jackson wrote her study of this
case, shewas hesitant to pass judgment, because “until the trial is concluded,
no one is really in a very good position to say whether anyone failed in their
duty of care for the citizenry.”19 Now that the trial and appeals have
concluded, we believe the time has come to review that testimony and pass
judgment on the ethics of the scientists’ rhetorical acts and failures to act in
this case.
De Bernardinis claimed in the trial that he did not know that the energy
dissipation theory he had heard was wrong. During the fırst trial, he stated
that had he known, he never would have disseminated that theory to the
public.20 Only the scientists had the expertise to correct his faulty state-
ments. That is why we cannot accept the conclusion that scientists should
leave the risk communication to government offıcials or communication
professionals. Risk communication is an essential part of risk analysis; the
two cannot be separated because risk analysis that is not communicated to
the public or to an intermediarywho can pass it on to the public is impotent.
We think an important lesson to take from this case is that scientists should
come to see themselves as scientist citizens, with a responsibility to analyze
the data, yes, but also a responsibility to effectively communicate the results
of that analysis to those who need to know it; and to do that, they must take
up a rhetorical ethos that not only displays technical expertise but also
demonstrates virtue, goodwill, and good judgment to communicate their
specialized knowledge with people who do not already share it.
The sense of rhetorical ethos that we invoke in this study of the L’Aquila
case encourages the development of habits of character that are oriented
toward the common good, so that to take up this ethos is to perform it, not
merely seem to do so.21 It draws from the Ciceronian idea that a person’s
various roles in life have corresponding offıcia (duties), and that rhetorical
activities are “social responsibilities through which the community and the
polity are sustained and enriched.”22 The sense of rhetorical citizenship that
we invoke sees public participation in discourse as central to what it means
to be a citizen.23 We draw on Robert Asen’s “discourse theory of citizen-
ship” that “conceives of citizenship as a mode of public engagement.”24 As
Kock and Villadsen put it, “discourse that takes place between citizens is
arguably more basic to what it means to be a citizen” than legal rights,
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privileges, and material conditions. Because “citizenship inherently has a
rhetorical side,” there is a need for rhetorical scholars to perform grounded
criticism to identify the “ruling discursive norms” in particular cases, norms
that, “whether they are recognized or not,” and though they are sometimes
“at odds with more abstract idealizations,” serve to guide civic life. The
concept of rhetorical citizenship suggests that citizens have “discursive
responsibilities or duties.”25 What those duties entail depends on the con-
tributory potential of the citizens involved. As philosopher Kwame An-
thony Appiah reminds us, “because citizens differ in what they have to
contribute, there is a great variety of ways of contributing responsibly, as a
citizen, to government by the people.”26We argue that when the citizens in
question are scientists with knowledge that is needed by their fellow citizens
to make good decisions, their rhetorical citizenship duties include public
communication drawing on an integrated rhetorical ethos.
SCIENTISTS AS CITIZENS
Sociologists Alan Irwin and Brian Wynne noted over 20 years ago the
pressing importance of studying “the relationship between scientifıc exper-
tise and the ‘general public.’”27 Attention to this concern continues to this
day, especially among thosewho study the relationship between science and
politics in democratic societies. Consider, for example, Sheila Jasanoff’s call
to sweep away “simplistic theoretical models of science-society relations”
and recalibrate “the relations between science and its multiple publics.”28
Especially when it comes to risk regulation, the need “for a new relationship
between science and the public” has become something of a commonplace
in such studies, where proposals for new models of “Postnormal Science”
and “Citizen Science” are advanced to negotiate “new relations between
expertise and citizens.”29
Given the importance of this line of research, it is unfortunate that those
offering such proposals tend to advocate only one way to heal the discon-
nect between science and citizens—namely, empowering citizens to enter
the province of science. As a case in point, consider risk communication
scholar Rolf Lidskog’s review of the literature on “the expert-lay divide,”
from which he concludes that all recent proposals to overcome the divide
“advocate inclusive strategies within knowledge production: that citizens
should not only be seen as passive receivers of scientifıc knowledge, but also
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as active partners in the production of knowledge.” Agreeing with these
recent proposals, he concludes that “earlier demarcations between science
and laypeople should be transgressed through a democratisation of science
and a scientisation of the citizenry.”30 The sensible chiasmus of this state-
ment implies that each side—science and the public—must step out of its
isolated sphere to meet in the overlapping middle space. Lidskog encour-
ages this interpretationwith ametaphor that envisions scientists swimming
downstream and the public swimming upstream. But we think a closer look
at recent proposals for resolving the expert-lay divide reveals that another
metaphor might be more apt. Models of postnormal science and citizen
science are designed to encourage movement of one party across a border;
they are pleas for “public inclusion” that urge scientists to open the gates of
their expert domain to the public and invite the public to swim up to enter
that previously forbidding realm. Lidskog’s summary fıts well with this
border-opening metaphor. “In short, science has to humanise itself by
bringing people back into science and by making explicit its basic assump-
tions, value-laden decisions, and practical implications. The public, in turn,
has to scientise itself by using its reflexive capacity to critically evaluate
science and produce knowledge of relevance to the understanding of envi-
ronmental risks.”31 In each case, the public is rightly encouraged to enter the
technical sphere of science; however, scientists are not explicitly encouraged
to cross the border between spheres to embrace their role as citizens in the
public sphere. The democratization and humanization of science that Lid-
skog describes is the opening of the erstwhile tightly controlled territory of
science to the public, not a recognition of the citizenship responsibilities of
scientists.32
This imbalance is noteworthy because Lidskog begins his study of
the expert-lay divide with two narratives that illustrate the diffıculties that
arise when scientists fail to accept their responsibility as public rhetors. In
the fırst, we are told that “plunderers sold barrels for two dollars each
to the inhabitants of an Iraqi community,” only to have it later “revealed that
the barrels originated from an Iraqi nuclear research centre and its waste
plant” where they had been used to store yellow cake. The local people who
bought the barrels and used them to wash clothes and store food “had no
information that the barrelswere contaminated” andwere bewilderedwhen
their children became sick. In the second case, a woman in a village near the
Chernobyl catastrophe relates her experience with an expert who offered
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advice on how to cope with the fallout: “along came some pompous idiot of
a scientist and gave a talk to the village club and said we had to wash the
fırewood. . . . You couldn’t believe your ears.”33 The clumsy communica-
tion of this scientist struck the villagers as running so counter to common
sense that it was dismissed out of hand.
Lidskog initially concludes that “both these stories are examples of how
diffıcult it can be for laypeople to understand expert advice aiming to
protect them from certain risks,” but then later he suggests that such a
reading is wrong, because “to reduce these stories to only being a problemof
risk communication would mean adopting the ‘defıcit model’ of public
understanding of science.” Like most scholars studying science and society
today, he rejects this model as an elitist attack on the intelligence of citizens;
after all, it is often the case that “expert claims are ignored by citizens not
because they are incomprehensible, but because they are deliberately re-
jected.”34We agree with Lidskog that the defıcit model is misguided, but we
do not think that identifying these cases as a problem of risk communica-
tion requires adopting that model. In fact, neither of Lidskog’s interpreta-
tions of these stories seems to fully capture the lesson they offer. In the fırst
case, the failure of Iraqi nuclear scientists to recognize their responsibility to
those outside their facility, a duty to clearly mark the barrels as contami-
nated, resulted in a total lack of communication on their part, not a failure
on the part of laypeople to understand expert advice, nor a deliberate
rejection of such advice by laypeople. Scientists demonstrated a lack of
goodwill and practical knowledge by placing deadly material in unmarked
barrels. Likewise, the tragedy of the expert-lay divide in the Chernobyl case
had more to do with a failure of scientists to act as public rhetors demon-
strating good judgment than with either laypeople’s cognitive defıciencies
or their thoughtful critical rejection of expert advice. Both cases are classic
examples of scientists failing to enact their role as citizens with good
rhetorical ethos in the public sphere; tragedy resulted when they neglected
their responsibility to effectively communicate what they knew to be a risk
to their fellow citizens.
In our view, the problem with the widely disdained defıcit model is not
just that it underestimates the intellectual capacity of nonexperts but that it
assumes that the fault of the defıcit lies on the public, and that if laypeople
could just be better educated, their minds would fıll with the sustenance of
scientifıc knowledge, and the expert-lay divide would be safely bridged. As
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much as they reject the defıcit model, many scholarly proposals for “public
inclusion” that bring citizens into science carry some residue of the assump-
tion that if the public could just be educated about science, the defıciency
separating science and the public would disappear. But what if the problem
is not the failure of laypeople to understand or participate in science, but the
failure of scientists to understand or participate in the public sphere?
Arguments that we develop a postnormal science that brings extended peer
communities into the assessment of risk, or that we remake members of the
generalpublic intopractitionersof citizen science, are arguments that laypeople
be brought into the technical sphere.35 But such cases as the ones that Lidskog
introduces suggest that there are times when a solution to the tragedy of the
expert-lay divide lies not in democratizing science or scientizing the public
but in bringing scientists out of their isolation in the technical sphere so that
they can embrace their rhetorical duty as citizens to speak to their fellow
citizens in the public sphere with arête, eunoia, and phronesis. Our analysis
of the L’Aquila case illustrates this most clearly.
CONTEXT FOR THE CASE: PUBLIC UNREST IN L’AQUILA
OnMarch 30, 2009, one week before a massive earthquake hit L’Aquila, the
Italian DCP Head Guido Bertolaso designated De Bernardinis, a former
professor of hydraulic engineering and his vice-head, as his substitute
public offıcial in charge of leading a special gathering of the MRC in
L’Aquila. On that day, Bertolaso sent out letters of convocation to the
leading Italian experts in seismology, explaining to them that the goal of the
special MRCmeeting in Abruzzo was to conduct “a careful investigation of
the matters of science and matters of civil protection related to the seismic
sequence of the last fourmonths that is ongoing in the territory of L’Aquila,
and that culminated in a shock of magnitude 4.0 on March 30, 2009, at
3:38pm.”36 That same day, the DCP also released a public statement to the
local press, announcing the MRC event planned for the following day and
clarifying to the local public that such a special meeting in town had
specifıcally the goal of providing the citizens with scientifıc information
about the swarm of earthquakes they had been experiencing.37
L’Aquila, the capital of the Abruzzo region in central Italy, is a townwith
a long history of destructive earthquakes. After the shock of March 30, and
the alarms about an impending destructive earthquake spread by a retired
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technician of the National Institute of Nuclear Physics and amateur “seis-
mic researcher” named Giampaolo Giuliani, the local residents appeared
more preoccupied than ever.38 In that period, many had been spending
their nights sleeping in their cars, enacting the local cautionary habit of
getting outside of potentially dangerous buildings in moments of perceived
high seismicity, a folkloric custom that the locals had been following for
generations as a way of protecting themselves and their families in periods
of heightened seismic risk, such as after moderately high-magnitude
shocks. At the end of March, the perceived seismic danger in L’Aquila had
reached its peak because of the incessant and intense seismic swarmbut also
because of Giuliani’s alarms. The residents’ interest in Giuliani’s cata-
strophic predictions—which he based on elevated radon gas readings along
fault lines and disseminated locally via word of mouth and social media
even after having been sued by the DCP for spreading false alarms—grew
proportionally with the increased frequency and magnitude of the seismic
swarm. Given the situation of general fear and public unrest, the local and
national authorities intervened with the intent of reestablishing public
order and safeguarding public safety.
THE MAJOR RISKS COMMISSION MEETING IN L’AQUILA AND ITS
AFTERMATH
In this context, on March 31, 2009, six of the top Italian scientists with
expertise in earthquakes convened in L’Aquila to attend the extraordinary
MRCmeeting. The six participants were Franco Barberi, a volcanologist at
the University of Rome “Roma Tre” and a former president of the DCP and
vice president of the MRC at the time of the facts; Enzo Boschi, Director of
the National Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology (INGV) in Rome;
Gian Michele Calvi, director of the European Centre for Training and
Research in Earthquake Engineering in Pavia; Mauro Dolce, head of the
seismic-risk offıce of the DCP in Rome; Claudio Eva, a professor of earth
physics at the University of Genoa; and Giulio Selvaggi, director of the
INGV’s National Earthquake Centre in Rome.39 The experts discussed the
ongoing seismic swarm, responded to questions about the risks associated
with the frequent seismic events that had generated the situation of local
public alarm, and reviewed the available data about the territory and its
structural vulnerabilities. Such local authorities as the Mayor of L’Aquila
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Massimo Cialente, the local DCP offıcer Daniela Stati, and a few others also
attended the event to gather accurate data from the experts.
In the local context of panic and confusion in L’Aquila, theMRCmeeting
was perceived as the chance to get an offıcial answer to a question that only
science could address at that point: both the local residents and the author-
ities in L’Aquila needed credible information to understand whether they
were in a moment of increased seismic risk. They also needed expert advice
about the appropriate actions and preventive measures to enact for public
safety.
THE MRC’S RISK ASSESSMENT
During the meeting, the scientists provided an overview of the seismic
data available about theAbruzzo area and focused on defending their stance
about the impossibility of predicting earthquakes against Giuliani’s alleged
ability to make reliable quake predictions with a margin of a few hours of
anticipation of a seismic event. During the discussion, Boschi observed: “It
is improbable that there will be an earthquake like the [massive] 1703 one in
the short term, although we cannot exclude it in the absolute.” Barberi also
emphasized the unreliability of predictions in seismic science. Eva observed
that of the many seismic sequences recorded in Italy in the last few years,
none had anticipated strong seismic events. However, Eva added: “obvi-
ously, L’Aquila being a seismic zone, it is not possible to state that there
won’t be earthquakes.” Boschi continued the assessment, explaining that
many small shocks should not be seen as a precursor phenomenon for big
earthquakes and that “it is impossible to make predictions.” He also added:
“L’Aquila’s territory is in a seismic zone of Level 2, and thus it requires
particular attention for the buildings, which need to be reinforced in order
to be resistant to earthquakes.” In agreement with this assessment, Selvaggi
and Barberi supported the idea that a seismic sequence is not a reliable
predictor of destructive earthquakes. Finally Barberi, prompted by the local
DCP offıcer Daniela Stati—who had asked for clarifıcation about the reli-
ability of the statements of “whoever affırms to be able tomake predictions”
(namely, Giuliani)—answered, in no uncertain terms, “Today we have no
instruments to make predictions, and therefore every prediction has no
scientifıc credential.”40
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Upon review, the discussion reported in the offıcial MRC minutes can-
not be interpreted as having a reassuring tone or content. The offıcial
minutes are a brief summary of theMRCmeeting, mostly revolving around
the nonpredictability of earthquakes supported by a short discussion of
seismic swarms that, according to the experts, may or may not precede a
major seismic event and therefore are not to be considered as a reliable
precursor to strong earthquake shocks.41 In the offıcial minutes of the
meeting, we see that the scientists used mostly hedged statements, defend-
ing uncertainty in the face of the deterministic pseudoscientifıc predictions
of the local self-professed expert. It is important to highlight this dispute
between mainstream science and Giuliani that was weaved into the discus-
sions of the experts during the MRC meeting of March 31. Because of
Giuliani’s popularity and the alarm that his predictions had caused among
the Aquilani, the MRC meeting became a venue to defend the authority of
the experts in terms of evaluation of seismic risk against Giuliani’s unorth-
odoxmethod of earthquake prediction based onmeasurement of radon gas.
The preoccupationwithGiuliani’s predictions during themeeting created a
rhetorical situation in which the scientists, pressured by the DCP to speak
about the technical question of the scientifıc predictability of earthquakes,
missed some important opportunities to use their expertise to rectify a
different and more dangerous kind of flawed information that ended up
circulating in the public sphere: namely, the information about the sup-
posed positive effect of seismic swarms reported to the public in their name
by the DCP after their meeting in L’Aquila.
De Bernardinis’s public communication debacle in L’Aquila happened
because the experts neglected to ensure during the meeting that the lay-
people in attendance—including De Bernardinis and such local authorities
as the mayor of L’Aquila and Stati—correctly understood the discussion of
the expert participants. By neglecting to ensure that the local authorities and
the DCP government offıcials accurately understood the data that they
presented on that occasion and by failing to correct a flawed interpretation
of their fındings that was reported to the public in their name by De
Bernardinis, they sanctioned that flawed interpretation, leaving it to circu-
late uncorrected in the public sphere. Most importantly, because De Ber-
nardinis acted as the offıcial spokesperson for theMRC after the meeting in
L’Aquila, the public perceived the information he reported as scientifıc,
reliable, and coming directly from the scientists—while in reality it was
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inaccurate and just as pseudoscientifıc as Giuliani’s alarms that the MRC
and the DCP were so invested in debunking.
MISSED OPPORTUNITY #1—SEISMIC SWARMS “IRONICALLY” POSITED AS POSITIVE
“ENERGY DISSIPATION”
The offıcial version of the MRC minutes was prepared by Dolce and only
undersigned by the other MRC experts when they gathered again in L’Aquila
on theafternoonofApril 6—after theearthquakedisasterhadalreadyoccurred.
However, the existence of an earlier and different version of those minutes,
written by Lorella Salvatori, a DCP employee in charge of taking notes during
the MRC meeting, was discussed at length during the trial. Salvatori testifıed
that the notes she took on that day for the DCP carefully reported the discus-
sions of the experts as they evolvedduring themeetingofMarch31 inL’Aquila.
Salvatori’s draft of theminutes is six pages long (the offıcial minutes are only a
one-page summary of themain themes discussed), and they aremostly consis-
tent with the offıcial version signed by the scientists that had been drafted and
polished by Dolce. However, a signifıcant difference surfaced during the trial:
Salvatori’s version includes a quote that was not included inDolce’sminutes. This
passage reports thatBarberi asks theother experts to commentonBertolaso’s view
of frequent small earthquake shocks as a favorable dissipation of energy from
underground.ThisflawedinterpretationwasnotdebunkedduringtheMRCmeet-
ing, and itwas later communicated to the local public byDeBernardinis.
Salvatori’s account reports that during the meeting, Barberi posed the
question to the other experts in these terms:
(BARBERI):Weknow thatAbruzzo is a high-risk seismic region.When there
have been major earthquakes in the past, there have also been seismic se-
quences similar to those that are happening today. What can you say about
this? I have heard the Head of the DCP declaring to the press, even if he’s not
a geophysicist, that when there are frequent seismic sequences there is a
dissipation of energy that makes it more possible for a strong shock to not
happen. What can you say about this?42
A more explicit statement of the energy dissipation theory can hardly be
imagined. According to Salvatori’s draft minutes, Eva’s response, which
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also appears in the offıcial minutes, does not directly answer the question
but instead notes the lack of recorded data from the past seismic sequences
of Abruzzo and the known seismicity of L’Aquila that makes it “impossible
to state that there won’t be earthquakes.”43 The omission of Barberi’s
question about the flawed “energy dissipation” statement of DCP Head
Bertolaso in Dolce’s offıcial version of minutes and the lack of an unambig-
uous answer to that question from the experts present on that occasion was
discussed in the fırst MRC trial. The experts had contradictory memories
about this point: one scientist recalls the question but others do not. Sel-
vaggi, for example, stated confıdently that he did not remember hearing it
during the meeting, saying: “I dissent strongly from the concept that the
seismic sequence dissipated energy and that it was to be considered as a
favorable sign: I never supported such an interpretation, and this themewas
never mentioned during the meeting.”44 Selvaggi even said that a concept
like that would have made him “jump on his chair.”45 Another expert
seemed to think that the ensuing conversation about lack of information
about past seismic swarmswas the best follow-up to Barberi’s questions and
did not feel the need tomore thoroughly debunk Bertolaso’s views reported
by Barberi. In his testimony, in fact, Eva declared that his words were fairly
reported in both versions of the minutes, and that he felt completely
comfortable signing them at the time. However, he insisted that his state-
ments needed to be contextualized and understood as an intervention
related to the larger conversation about seismic swarms introduced by
Boschi and Selvaggi at the outset of the meeting rather than a direct re-
sponse to Barberi’s debated questions. In fact, he clearly stated: “I dissent
strongly with the idea that the seismic sequence was dissipating seismic
energy and thus it could be interpreted as a favorable sign. That proposition
is scientifıcally flawed.”46 During the trial, Salvatori was also questioned
about her notes from the meeting, specifıcally about Barberi’s mention of
Bertolaso’s “energy dissipation” interpretation, and she explained that the
question had been indeed asked during the meeting by Barberi. She con-
fırmed that “the term ‘energy dissipation’ was never mentioned again dur-
ing that meeting. The discussion shifted to discussing the seismic
sequence.”47
Barberi himself declared in the trial that he did not remember with
precision what he said, but at the same time he suspected that if he actually
had uttered that question—as the unoffıcial draft of the minutes of the
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meeting suggests—he must had done so with subtle irony. He declared in
court:
(BARBERI): I would like to add that my statement there was also a bit ironic,
as I had heard the head of the DCP declare to the press, even though he is not
a geophysicist, that when there are more frequent seismic sequences they
dissipate energy and there aremore probabilities that the strong one does not
happen, so I asked what they could say about it? That’s the sense of this
discourse.48
From this testimony, it seems likely that the interpretation of the ongoing
shocks as positive “energy dissipation” did appear during the meeting, in
the words of Barberi reporting on Bertolaso’s statement. We also learn that
Barberi’s questionwas not answered directly during the experts’ discussion,
possibly because Barberi was using a bit of irony asking it, or just because
the rest of the discussion about seismic swarms seemed suffıcient to implic-
itly debunk Bertolaso’s interpretation without the need of further response
to something that the head of the DCP had mentioned in public but that
they found ridiculous and thus not worthy of attention or discussion.
Barberi’s use of ironywhenposing this question to the groupof experts—
and the experts’ neglect in answering that question in an accessible way for
the laypeople in attendance to understand that such an interpretation of the
ongoing seismic sequence was wrong—showcases a failure of goodwill and
good judgment on the part of the scientists. Not taking this topic seriously
during ameeting that laypeople were attending to gather accurate informa-
tion to report to the broader public represented a serious error in orienta-
tion toward that nonexpert audience, because making fun of Bertolaso’s
interpretation not only mocks laypeople for believing unscientifıc balder-
dash but also fails them by not correcting that flawed interpretation of the
science. The consequence of this lack of goodwill toward the nonexpert
audience in L’Aquila, namely, leaving “scientifıcally flawed information”
uncorrected in front of the local authorities who needed to understand it,
also points to a failure of practical wisdom in their public discourse. Inac-
curate information conveyed to the nonexpert audience jeopardized the
goals of the MRCmeeting and consequently public safety. A simple clarifı-
cation by the experts of the lack of scientifıc validity of Bertolaso’s “energy
dissipation” interpretation of the seismic swarms could have prevented the
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further dissemination of that flawed interpretation to the public during the
press release and televised interviews that followed the MRC meeting. In
neglecting to publicly debunk a flawed interpretation of the seismic phe-
nomena during an ad hoc MRC meeting organized to provide the public
with the most accurate information about the ongoing seismic risk in
L’Aquila, the experts missed the fırst key opportunity to enact rhetorical
citizenship andprevent the circulation of flawed scientifıc information, thus
increasing rather than reducing the local residents’ exposure to seismic risk
when the major earthquake hit the town just fıve days after the meeting.
MISSED OPPORTUNITY #2—DANIELA STATI’S MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE MRC’S
RISK ASSESSMENT AS “REASSURING” GOES UNCORRECTED AT THE
CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING
Another salient missed opportunity to correct the flawed interpretation of
nonexperts that would be communicated to the public occurred at the end
of the meeting. According to Salvatori, the local DCP offıcer Stati declared
to the experts: “Thank you verymuch for your assessment that will allowme
to go out there and reassure the population via the media that we will meet
during the press conference.”49 This statement, surprisingly, did not elicit
any response from the experts. None of the scientists objected to Stati’s view
of their fındings as “reassuring” or clarifıed for her that their risk assessment
could not be interpreted as a comforting message. Not questioning or
debunking the idea that their assessment could be used to “reassure the
public via the media” in the following press conference was another missed
opportunity for the experts to demonstrate their goodwill toward their
fellow citizens by working to protect them from false information. The
repeated mentioning of the press conference and the media also suggests
that the experts should have had at least some awareness that this assess-
ment would be communicated to the public. In failing to consider the
negative consequences of a false reassurance being disseminated by Stati,
they also failed again to demonstrate the practical wisdom of citizens
drawing upon rhetorical ethos, instead demonstrating a narrow ethos of
expertise divorced from civic life.
Salvatori reported that themeetingwas dismissed at 7:30 PM,when Stati,
the mayor of L’Aquila, De Bernardinis, and Barberi went on to lead a press
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conference with another two public offıcials of the DCP. When questioned
about her statement at the end of the MRC meeting, Stati declared that
during the MRC discussion she had heard with certainty that the seismic
swarmwas favorable because it allowed a continuous dissipation of seismic
energy. Stati remembers having heard this interpretation of the swarm from
one of the experts; she did not remember clearly which one of them uttered
those words, but she clearly remembered hearing those words and that the
statement was not contested by anyone present. From the trial testimony
and documents, we learn that those words were probably uttered by Barberi
with an ironic connotation that Stati did not catch. None of the experts
intervened to debunk the flawed interpretation attributed to Bertolaso by
Barberi, thus reinforcing the misunderstanding of the local authorities in
attendance who were not equipped to detect Barberi’s subtle irony nor
process the very technical assessment of the seismic swarm that followed
Barberi’s question. In fact, Stati during the trial testimony explained her
misunderstanding as follows, reporting what she remembered from the day
of the meeting:
(STATI): I remember that I asked several times, after the statements of the
experts, like Prof. Boschi. . . . I just want to say once again: I am not an expert.
I was told that we could do this press release, they talked about details, they
said. . . . I don’t remember exactly who said that, that these shocks that
preceded . . . That it was not sure that these shocks could be a precursor to a
big seismic event, exactly because they were dissipating energy, thus prevent-
ing the accumulation of energy in the underground and a series of thingswere
said. My questions were not technical, I want to state this once again: I was
only concerned about what to say to the journalists out there. My question
was validated by the sense of calm fromDe Bernardinis and the other people
present that told me I could reassure the public.50
When questioned by the prosecutor during the fırst trial, she confırmed
once again:
(STATI): I remember that more or less everyone had said on that occasion
what I explained earlier, namely that the small shocks were just dissipating
energy from the underground. I remember that it had been said, but I can’t
remember who said that exactly, that these small shocks that we were
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perceiving were shocks that were dissipating energy and that this could be
considered a seismic swarm, a series of sequences of shocks, one after the
other, that were not to be considered precursors of a big one.51
A posteriori, we realize that Stati misunderstood the discussions of the
experts and took their silence at the end of themeeting as an endorsement of
her interpretation. Stati reported that she was worried about what to say to
the journalists and the public and that she had asked for the validation of the
experts several times, but none of them intervened to make sure that she
understood correctly what to report to the public. Most notably, she
thanked the entire group in attendance during the meeting for having
provided reassuring information to communicate during the upcoming
press conference—as carefully reported by Salvatori in the conclusion of the
draft minutes of the MRC meeting—and once again none of the experts
intervened to clarify that none of the information they had discussed during
that meeting could be interpreted as reassuring. Had they done so, they
could have prevented Stati’s misunderstanding from being spread to the
public.
MISSED OPPORTUNITY #3—DE BERNARDINIS: RISK COMMUNICATION GONE
WRONG
The popularizer of Bertolaso’s flawed interpretation of the seismic swarm as
“energy dissipation” was primarily DCP Vice-Head De Bernardinis: on
May 31, 2009, he talked to the press before the MRCmeeting—recording a
video interview that was televised that evening—and led a press conference
after the MRC meeting. On both occasions, De Bernardinis’s public com-
munication turned out to be not only problematic in style but above all
inaccurate in content.
Even before the MRC meeting with the scientists, De Bernardinis re-
corded a video interview for a local TV station that conveyed an unwar-
ranted message of reassurance to the local public. When questioned during
the trial proceedings, the scientists clearly identifıed the information con-
veyed by De Bernardinis as “surprising,” “not agreed upon,” and “scientif-
ically flawed.”52 He communicated to the residents of L’Aquila a public
message that we can sum up as follows: according to the scientists, he
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confıdently remarked, therewas nothing exceptional or new toworry about.
He reported that the experts saw the ongoing seismic swarm as indicative of
a “favorable situation” as it signaled a gradual “dissipation” of seismic
energy that posed “no danger” to the local population because the related
eventswere not strong enough to damage the buildings in town and because
the seismic events, he also implied, were “dissipating seismic energy” from
the underground, thus preventing the possibility of a big earthquake. Re-
sponding to a journalist who asked De Bernardinis about the potential
danger of the ongoing shocks, he declared:
(DE BERNARDINIS): There is no danger. I told the Mayor of Sulmona that
the scientifıc community keeps confırming tome that, on the contrary, this is
a favorable situation because there is a continuous dissipation of en-
ergy . . . thus we did see some serious events, but they’re not too intense, and
in fact so far we have had just minor damage.53
De Bernardinis also said on that occasion that the local residents should
consider the seismic swarm a normal phenomenon for the territory, sug-
gesting that it was time to relax and let go of the primal fear of a destructive
earthquake. When prompted by the same journalist, he suggested that the
local residents should stop worrying about the unjustifıed alarms circulat-
ing around town (namely, Giuliani’s alarms), go back to their houses
(instead of sleeping outside in fear, as they had been doing for a while), and
have a glass of good local red wine:
(JOURNALIST): And in the meantime, shall we drink a good glass of wine
from Ofena?
(DEBERNARDINIS): Absolutely, absolutely, have a glass ofD.O.C.Montep-
ulciano wine: this is important!54
Leading the press conference that followed the MRC meeting that after-
noon, acting de facto as the spokesperson for the group ofMRC experts, De
Bernardinis repeated that same flawed message that he had already con-
veyed in his short televised interview from earlier in the day. The video of
the press conference that was used in court has no audio, but the trial
testimony of those who attended confırmed that the message communi-
cated by De Bernardinis was essentially identical to the one of his earlier
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video interview: expressing the idea that the seismic swarmposed no danger
because it dissipated energy, reducing the odds of larger shocks. In one of
the few video fragments of the press conference for which the audio was
recovered, we also hearDeBernardinis adding another scientifıc inaccuracy
regarding the seismic swarm that once again demonstrates his misunder-
standing of the science discussed during the meeting. He said: “The seismic
swarm can last quite a bit. It could have an extended length, but we do not
expect an increase in magnitude of the seismic events.”55 None of the
experts had expressed this concept in the deterministic terms that De
Bernardinis reported.
Examining the video of the press conference led by De Bernardinis and
reading the testimony of all the participants during the MRC trial, we fınd
that even more surprising than the inaccurate information that was being
communicated on that occasion is that no MRC expert stood up to correct
that flawed set of statements. Three of the six earthquake experts who
attended the MRC meeting were also at the press conference in which De
Bernardinis spoke to the public. In the press conference video that was used
in court, we see Barberi sitting next to De Bernardinis in the panel of
speakers for the press conference that included (from left to right) Barberi,
De Bernardinis, and Stati. As a speaker on the panel, Barberi had an
opportunity, not only as amember of theMRCbut also as a scientist citizen,
to correct the misinformation that De Bernardinis conveyed, but he chose
not to. Furthermore, in that same video of the press conference, we also see
Dolce and Calvi sitting in the back of the room during the event, attending
without speaking to the public or intervening in the discussion. Like Bar-
beri, Dolce and Calvi never intervened to rectify, clarify, or elaborate on De
Bernardinis’s statements. They did not speak up to correct the errors in
interpretation ofDeBernardinis and Stati, not in the context of themeeting,
as illustrated earlier, and not even when they heard the flawed statements
being communicated in public. When interrogated about his presence
during the press conference, Calvi said that he had no memories of it, and
that he could say that he was there only because he was visible on the video
of that event: “I did not actively participate in the press conference, from the
point of view of communicating information. I can tell that I was there,
obviously, because I’m visible in the video.”56 Attending the offıcial press
conference with De Bernardinis without correcting him validated what he
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was saying in the eyes of the public by conveying their tacit assent of his
disastrously reassuring statements.
The offıcial remarks released to the local media during the press confer-
ence by De Bernardinis—reinforced by the presence of three of the six
experts involved in the MRC meeting (Barberi, Calvi, and Dolce)—
convinced the local public that it was wiser and more reasonable to remain
indoors despite the known vulnerability of many local buildings and the
continuous shocks of the seismic swarm. In the context of this press con-
ference, the earthquake scientists’ embodied expertise made a silent but
powerful argument that De Bernardinis was communicating accurately
what they had just said in the MRC meeting. Unfortunately, we know that
this is not true and that De Bernardinis’s communication was highly
problematic.
During the trial, the other three defendants admitted that the right thing
to do on this occasion would have been to interrupt the press conference to
correct the misinformation being conveyed. Boschi, for instance, stated
during the trial that not only did he not knowabout the press conference but
also that he was shocked when, after the big earthquake, he discovered what
was said on that occasion. Specifıcally, he declared that he was outraged by
“what was being communicated to the journalists” and by the “modalities
and contents of the communication to the media,” especially because those
contents and modalities “had not mutually been agreed upon, in any way,
during the meeting.”57 Similarly, Eva, who also did not participate in the
press conference, said that he did not know about it. “Had I been there I
would have contested the content of the information being communicated.
I would have dissented, or at least I would have brought up some scientifıc
corrections.”58 Selvaggi also later distanced himself from the contents of the
press conference, saying “I did not know about the press conference, and I
did not contribute, in anyway, to what had been communicated during that
conference. I am extraneous to those public declarations.” He also recorded
his “dissent on the opinion that the seismic sequence could be considered
normal, because we cannot express a judgment of what is the norm for the
numerous seismic sequences that happen in the Appennines.”59
The concerning point of this communication debacle is that although all
the experts agreed, during the trial, about the dangerous flaws in the content
of De Bernardinis’s statements, they either did not bother to pay attention
to the public communication that came out of their meeting in the days
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immediately following it, or they were at the press conference but did not
intervene even though their words were beingmisrepresented and reported
with a disastrously reassuring connotation.
During the trial, De Bernardinis repeated several times that he would not
have talked in those terms if someone had corrected him. In response to a
question about whether he knew that seismic swarms could precede a larger
earthquake, rather than dissipate seismic energy, he said in court:
(DE BERNARDINIS): No one told me that there were precursors. I am a
hydraulic engineer, more specifıcally my expertise is in fluid mechanics. . . . I
had full trust and complete loyalty in the experts. . . . they did not tell me
anything different.60
The energy dissipation theorymight havemade perfect sense to a hydraulic
engineer. But because that expertise was not relevant to the earthquake
science being discussed at the meeting of the MRC, De Bernardinis was
acting as a layperson in that context. It was the duty of those with relevant
expertise to correct his misunderstanding, either during the meeting itself
or after the meeting when he disseminated his inaccurate statements to
others in the name of the scientists.
In a particularly tense moment during the MRC trial—when the prose-
cutor asked Bertolaso to explain the origin of his theory of “energy dissipa-
tion”—he responded that in the threemonths preceding theMRCmeeting,
he spoke about the seismicity of L’Aquila with major experts in the fıeld.
(BERTOLASO): Regarding those statements about the energy dissipa-
tion . . . that is not something I made up. During the period of my responsi-
bilities as Head of the DCP, while I was on duty, I said those things hundreds
of times to the experts, and not once, Dr. Picuti, not even once. . . . any
scientist worthy of this name has ever corrected me or told me “what are you
talking about?”—Not even one of them, before 3:32 a.m. of April 6, 2009, has
ever contested my statements.61
In this testimony, Bertolaso, an MD with an expertise in public health,
claimed that before the tragic events of April 6, no earthquake scientist of
those he had consulted in the period leading to the MRC meeting had ever
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bothered correcting his wrong understanding of the character of seismic
swarms.
Regarding the public communication of risk of De Bernardinis, the
scientists had several opportunities to correct his errors—and Bertolaso’s
error, too—but they never did. De Bernardinis’s disastrous reassurance was
not only covered by the local news but was also widely reported by the
national news media, including the state TV networks; as documented in
the trial, several national newscasts and newspapers talked about the MRC
meeting in L’Aquila and its “reassuring” outcome, but even aftermaking the
national headlines, no expert intervened to correct the flawed report of their
discussion.62 By sharing their knowledge with each other during the MRC
meeting as if it were a technical sphere discussion only, knowing full well
that public offıcials were overhearing their conversation and would report
what they comprehended to the public, the experts failed to perform their
duty of rhetorical citizenship in L’Aquila. In a letter that was later published
in Science, Boschi argued that risk analysis, not risk communication,was the
responsibility of the scientists:
The localCPA is responsible for accurate communication of risk and effective
management of emergency situations. I did not disseminate false or impru-
dent information. My question is: what could I do to avoid conviction? I
suppose I should have foreseen the earthquake!63
Even if we assume—as Boschi did here—that it was not the scientists’ job to
communicate directly to the general public, we still fınd his perspective
highly problematic. At the very least, the scientists had the responsibility to
communicate the inaccuracy of the energy dissipation theory to the DCP
offıcials and other laypeople responsible for communicating the risk the
scientists identifıed to the broader public and to correct themisunderstand-
ing of both Stati and De Bernardinis when they heard themmaking inaccu-
rate statements at the meeting and at the press conference, respectively.
Scientists are not just experts: they are also citizens in the public sphere in
which their expertise has a serious impact. The residents of L’Aquila, who
had been anxiously waiting to receive scientifıcally reliable information
from the experts of theMRC, felt reassured after hearing themedia coverage
of the press conference reinforced by De Bernardinis’s earlier video inter-
view. Because of the link between the seismic swarm and the favorability of
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the situation as claimed by De Bernardinis, many residents of L’Aquila
started interpreting the continued shocks as positive signs. They made
decisions about what to do based on what they discovered, too late and
unironically, to be a “scientifıcally flawed” message. Many Aquilani who
changed their behavior in response to what they had heard on March 31
ended up dying under the rubble of their homes on the morning of the
quake of April 6, 2009.
Science cannot predict earthquakes; however, studying this case teaches
us that there was something more that the scientists could have done for
their fellow citizens in L’Aquila: we have identifıed at least three missed
opportunities pinpointed in the fırst trial in which they could have inter-
vened in the public conversation about seismic risk, precisely because as
fellow citizens in the public sphere they had an ethical and civic duty to
correct the flawed information that the DCP had been passing to the
residents of L’Aquila in their name. Because of their expertise, the scientists
were the only citizens who could have rectifıed that error. Failing to practice
their rhetorical citizenship resulted in disastrous consequences in L’Aquila.
Like the scientists in Iraq who failed to clearly mark the barrels that would
be storing radioactive waste, or the scientists near Chernobyl who failed to
adequately explain why fırewood should be washed, the scientists of the
MRC demonstrated a lack of goodwill toward their fellow citizens when
they responded to a faulty theory about energy dissipation with irony or
silence. They exhibited a breakdown of good sense when they failed to
correct a public offıcial’s faulty conclusion that their risk analysis had been
reassuring, and they showed a surfeit of virtue when they failed to correct
misinformation that was being passed along to the public in their name.
REINTEGRATING TECHNICAL AND PUBLIC SPHERES: THE RHETORICAL
CITIZENSHIP OF SCIENTISTS
Studying this case in detail by drawing from the trial documents and
testimony allowed us to identify the points of articulation in which the
communication of science went wrong in L’Aquila. We focused in particu-
lar on missed opportunities for the scientists to cross the boundaries of the
technical sphere and act as rhetorical citizens oriented toward protecting
the public good. Such missed opportunities arose in L’Aquila when scien-
tifıc information migrated, or failed to migrate, from the technical realm of
SCIENTIST CITIZENS 121
This work originally appeared in Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 22.1, spring  2019, published by Michigan State University Press
risk assessment in the meeting to the public sphere via institutional risk
communication. By identifying those missed opportunities, we want to
encourage scientists and experts to think of their role in society as going
beyond the mere deployment of their expertise in the technical sphere. The
scientists’ expertise, when confıned to the technical sphere, can be vulner-
able to distortion, exploitation, neglect, or misunderstanding in the public
sphere.
The burden of bridging the expert-lay divide, as this case demonstrates,
cannot be placed on laypeople only. Our analysis of the communication
debacle in L’Aquila shows that it is also necessary to reflect on the other side
of this relationship: it is necessary to start thinking of experts as rhetorical
citizens, too. Bridging the gap between experts and lay citizens is possible
when scientists recognize that their professional role does not separate them
from the communities in which they dwell. Recognizing that they also are
citizens within the public sphere—citizens endowed with a special agency
derived from their technical knowledge, who also have the ethical respon-
sibility to communicate that expertise when it is salient to do so for the
public good—can help to eliminate the gap between experts and lay publics.
Encouraging scientists to recognize that they exist in and operate across
the two spheres, the technical and the public, will increase the chances that
they will perform their civic duty of sharing their expertise with those who
do not have it. Had the MRC experts identifıed as scientist citizens with the
ethical responsibility to communicate with their fellow citizens in L’Aquila
(either by speaking thoughtfully with the designated risk communicator or
correcting his inaccurate public statements), they would not have let disas-
trous reassurances circulate uncorrected in the public sphere. Being ac-
countable for the ways their expertise was used to make decisions about
public safety would have meant, in this case, clarifying for the public that
they had no reassurances or new information to offer to those who were
worried about the seismic shocks in Abruzzo and were trying to decide
between sleeping outside, as their precautionary habits prescribed, or re-
turning inside their houses at their own risk.
What happened in L’Aquila was not unique to that case. Similar disas-
trous breakdowns of communication between technical experts and publics
have occurred in the past and will likely arise again in the future. One
signifıcant case of failed risk communication that has been studied in depth
by rhetoricians is worth recalling at this time. When the U.S. space shuttle
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Challenger exploded on takeoff in 1986, scholars of rhetoric analyzed the
failed risk communication between engineers and managers that precipi-
tated the tragedy. They concluded that managers made the fatal decision to
launch the spacecraft on that cold day, despite the heightened risk identifıed
by technical experts, because those managers adopted a “prior interpretive
framework” that mistakenly read “ambiguous language” from the engi-
neers, and lack of defınitive evidence that there would be a catastrophe, as a
reassurance that all would gowell.64 As in the L’Aquila case, “a reluctance to
cross role boundaries” kept the engineers from effectively correcting that
misinterpretation; even though they had several opportunities to register
their opposition to the launch decision, they did not do so because they felt
“that it was not their place to do so.”65 As Alan Gross and ArtWalzer put it
in their analysis of the Challenger case, “Strong role differentiation is a
useful but, potentially, a dangerous concept.”66 Like Gross and Walzer, we
ground our judgment of this case in a classical perspective of rhetoric as “an
art recoverable in the interest of civitas, of organizations viewed as good
citizens.”67 Just as ethos can refer to both the character of an individual
speaker and the character of a larger social structure, such as the “ethos of
science,” so too does ethical responsibility in such cases lie with both the
individual scientists and with science as a profession that too often habitu-
ates its practitioners to see themselves as fundamentally and properly sep-
arate from the public sphere. By recognizing their responsibility as
rhetorical citizens to communicate their specialized knowledge to fellow
citizens who lack that knowledge, experts in the technical sphere can em-
brace their role as scientist citizens with a rhetorical duty of care to ensure
that the results of their risk analysis are accurately and effectively conveyed
to those in need of that knowledge.
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